INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF TRADITIONAL AND DIGITAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN AGRI-FOOD CHAINS

Abstract

The article examines the underlying reason for the high transaction costs of peasant (farmer) farms when connected to digital food chains – the institutional incompatibility of traditional local markets and algorithmic platform solutions. Based on the theory of transaction costs and the methodology of comparative institutional analysis, the concept of «institutional gap» is introduced, which captures the systemic discrepancy between the rules of coordination: informal trust, reputational mechanisms and flexibility of conditions characteristic of fairs and local intermediaries come into conflict with strict standardization, formal contracts and algorithmic control, which are embedded in the architecture of digital marketplaces. It is shown that it is this gap, and not just a lack of technical skills or finances, that leads to the exclusion of a significant part of small farms from commodity chains, and attempts to force the formalization of the farmer multiply the costs of adaptation and undermine his economic independence. As a theoretical solution, the hypothesis of a hybrid institution is substantiated – a cooperative service integrator capable of closing the institutional gap without destroying the informal nature of small agricultural production.